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I. INTRODUCTION
After forty years in the United States, a resident alien named Jose
Padilla faces deportation because he pled guilty to three drug charges,
1
including a felony drug trafficking charge. After learning that he
would be deported because of the convictions, Padilla sought to
change his plea by claiming that he had only pled guilty because his
appointed attorney told him that the guilty plea would not affect his
2
immigration status. Padilla’s claim that his attorney’s gross misadvice
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel highlights a
quandary within Sixth Amendment law: does the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel set standards for the advice attorneys give criminal
clients about the collateral consequences of plea agreements and, if
so, is the standard for failure to advise different from affirmative
3
misadvice? In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court will address
that question and, in doing so, help decide if Jose Padilla can remain
in the United States.
II. FACTS
Jose Padilla is facing deportation because he pled guilty to three
4
drug crimes. Prior to his arrest, Padilla was a legal resident in the
5
United States working as a commercial truck driver. In September
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2001, Padilla was stopped by police officers for failing to display a
6
weight and distance tax ID on his truck. Padilla consented to a
search of the truck and officers uncovered over 1,000 pounds of
7
marijuana. Padilla was indicted by a grand jury on four charges,
8
including felony trafficking in marijuana. Before trial, the
prosecution offered Padilla a deal in which he would plead guilty to
felony trafficking in marijuana and the two misdemeanor drug
charges and they would recommend a sentence for Padilla of five
9
years in prison and five years on probation.
According to Padilla, he pleaded guilty because his appointed
lawyer assured him that he “did not have to worry” about deportation
10
because he had lived in the United States for more than forty years.
The trial court accepted the proposed agreement on October 4,
11
2002. Two years after he pleaded guilty, Padilla filed a pro se motion
12
to vacate his conviction. In it, he claimed that his lawyer violated his
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel by giving him incorrect
13
advice on the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.
The trial court denied Padilla’s motion, holding that the defendant
did not have to be educated on all possible consequences of his guilty
14
plea in order for it to be valid. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that although
attorneys do not have to educate their clients on all possible
consequences in order for the pleas to be valid under the Sixth
15
Amendment, they cannot give such advice incorrectly. The court
held that, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, there is a difference
between failure to advise and affirmative misadvice. The
Commonwealth of Kentucky appealed the ruling to the state supreme

6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Padilla, No.
08-651 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2009).
7. See id. at 2–3 (discussing the attempt by Padilla’s defense counsel to suppress the
evidence uncovered by the search; the trial court eventually found that both the consent and
search were valid).
8. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at 11.
13. Id. at 11 (explaining that Padilla requested an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether his guilty plea was prejudiced by his attorney’s incompetence).
14. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
15. Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, *7 (Ky.
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006) (distinguishing counsel’s misadvice on collateral consequences from the
lack of advice).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment seeks to ensure that a defendant in a
criminal case is provided with counsel who advises the defendant on
the consequences of a conviction that are relevant to the criminal
prosecution. When a criminal defense lawyer advises a defendant to
plead guilty, the courts are generally concerned with the voluntariness
of the defendant’s plea. The Supreme Court, in Brady v. United
17
18
States and Boykin v. Alabama, established that a plea may be
considered voluntary as long as the defendant knows the direct
consequences of conviction and understands the rights being waived.
If a defendant claims that his attorney’s ineffective assistance led
him to plead guilty, he must satisfy the test established in Strickland v.
19
Washington. The Strickland test considers whether counsel acted
incompetently and, if so, whether counsel’s incompetence prejudiced
20
the defendant by rendering the plea involuntary.
The Supreme Court has never determined whether misadvice on
collateral consequences can be the basis of a Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The closest that the Supreme
21
Court has come to addressing this issue is Hill v. Lockhart. In Hill, a
criminal defendant claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had been violated when his lawyer misadvised him on parole
22
eligibility. The Court found that the defendant had not shown that
23
Consequently, it declined to
his lawyer’s advice prejudiced him.
address whether the defendant’s lawyer was ineffective by
misadvising the defendant on the collateral consequence of parole
24
eligibility.
Without direction from the Supreme Court on this issue, federal
and state courts have developed a doctrine of limited exception for

16. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
17. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (finding that only an understanding of
direct consequences is necessary for a defendant to provide a voluntary guilty plea).
18. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (establishing that a trial court must confirm
with the defendant on the record that the defendant understands the direct consequences of a
guilty plea and the constitutional rights it waives).
19. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 53–55.
23. Id. at 60.
24. Id.
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misadvice on collateral consequences. Currently, all of the Federal
circuits and twenty-one states allow defendants whose lawyers
misadvised them on the collateral consequences of their guilty pleas
to use the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to challenge the
25
voluntariness of their pleas. This doctrine does not alter or contest
the norm that a defendant must only understand the direct
26
consequences of a guilty plea for it to be considered voluntary; it
does, however, develop a Sixth Amendment standard for advice a
defense lawyer chooses to give regarding collateral consequences.
The federal and state courts that have encountered this issue have
adopted different interpretations of the Sixth Amendment’s standard
for advice on collateral consequences. Some jurisdictions have held
that the Sixth Amendment imposes a general standard that misadvice
on collateral consequences may constitute a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel if the misadvice was a material component in the
27
decision to plead guilty. Other jurisdictions have been unwilling to
interpret the Sixth Amendment as setting out a general standard for
advice on collateral consequences, but have held that misadvice on
collateral immigration consequences may constitute ineffective
28
assistance of counsel.
Many of the federal circuit courts began establishing a Sixth
Amendment standard on misadvice about collateral consequences in

25. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484–85 (Ky. 2008) (listing cases that
have concluded that gross misadvice of a collateral consequence may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel).
26. Brief for the Respondent at 7, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. May 25, 2009).
27. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 484. See also Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988)
(finding that gross misadvice regarding parole eligibility may be cause for ineffective assistance
of counsel); Cepulonis v. Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[A]lthough defendant need
not be informed of the details of his parole eligibility, ‘misinformation may be more vulnerable
to constitutional challenge than mere lack of information.’”); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61,
65 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that gross misadvice by a defendant’s lawyer concerning parole
eligibility may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
28. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 484–85 (citing several cases upholding misadvice exception).
See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that affirmative
misrepresentation of deportation consequences qualifies as ineffective assistance of counsel
where counsel represented himself as an expert in immigration law yet did not recommend to
the sentencing judge a sentence two days shorter to ensure that his client was not deported);
United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirmative misrepresentation
regarding immigration consequences is deficient according to the first prong of the Strickland
test for reasonable effectiveness); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1539–41 (11th
Cir. 1985) (finding affirmative misrepresentation regarding immigration consequences, coupled
with likelihood that petitioner would be imprisoned and executed after deportation, could be
ineffective assistance); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930, 935 (Utah 2005) (holding that
counsel is not required to advise on deportation consequences of a guilty plea, but recognizing
the exception for when counsel affirmatively misadvises a client on such consequences).
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cases that involved misadvice regarding parole eligibility. For
instance, in Sparks v. Sowders, the Sixth Circuit held that a defense
lawyer’s incorrect advice to a client that he must plead guilty to be
eligible for parole may have violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and raised legitimate questions about
30
whether the defendant entered into the plea agreement voluntarily.
According to Sparks, an affirmative act of gross misadvice regarding
the collateral consequence of parole eligibility may constitute a claim
31
for post-conviction relief.
Commonwealth v. Padilla was the first case before the Supreme
Court of Kentucky that presented the question of whether misadvice
on a collateral consequence could amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel. Before Padilla, Commonwealth v. Fuartado was the only
collateral consequences case that Kentucky’s supreme court had
32
heard. In Fuartado, the Kentucky court held that a criminal defense
attorney’s failure to advise on collateral consequences, such as
deportation, did not constitute a claim for a Sixth Amendment
33
violation.
Given that Fuartado only treated the issue of failing to advise, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals found Padilla’s claim that misadvice on
collateral consequences violated his Sixth Amendment right to
34
counsel was one of first impression. Consequently, it looked to the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Sparks, and held that the misadvice Padilla
received could constitute a claim for ineffective assistance of
35
counsel.
IV. HOLDING
In Commonwealth v. Padilla, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held
that misadvice on a collateral consequence of a guilty plea can never
36
be the basis for a Sixth Amendment claim. In doing so, the majority
held that an affirmative act of misadvice on collateral consequences is

29. Sparks, 852 F.2d at 885.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005).
33. See id. at 386 (defendant alleging that defense counsel’s failure to advise him on the
potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea to marijuana trafficking constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel).
34. Padilla v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001981-MR, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 98, at *7
(Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006).
35. Id.
36. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
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no different than the failure to advise on collateral consequences.
Because it held that misadvice on collateral consequences is the same
as failing to advise, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that it
38
was bound to follow Commonwealth v. Fuartado.
The court maintained this position even after acknowledging that
a number of jurisdictions regarded misadvice and failure to advise on
collateral consequences as different with regard to Sixth Amendment
39
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Though it recognized that
several jurisdictions had held that affirmative misadvice regarding
collateral consequences could be the basis of a Sixth Amendment
40
claim, the Kentucky court ultimately concluded that it was obligated
to follow the rationale of Fuartado. Because Fuartado held that
advice on collateral consequences is not within the scope of the Sixth
Amendment, the Kentucky court concluded that misadvice on
collateral consequences is also outside the scope of a claim for
41
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In dissent, Justice Cunningham argued that Fuartado’s holding did
not prevent the court from finding that the Sixth Amendment
imposed a standard on attorneys who choose to advise their clients on
42
collateral consequences. The dissent declared that “[c]ounsel who
gives erroneous advice to a client which influences a felony conviction
is worse than no lawyer at all,” and proposed that lawyers should
43
admit lack of knowledge rather than give erroneous advice.
V. ANALYSIS
The Kentucky Supreme Court should have differentiated between
the failure to advise illustrated in Fuartado and the misadvice present
in Padilla. A defendant in a criminal case deserves accurate advice in
order to ensure that his plea is voluntary. Advice should be accurate
for both direct and collateral consequences, even if the lawyer is not
required to provide advice on collateral consequences. The questions
presented by Fuartado and Padilla are sufficiently distinct to justify
the establishment of a holding on misadvice regarding collateral
consequences. The Kentucky court’s disregard of the widely-

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 484–85.
Id. at 485.
Id. (Cunningham, J., dissenting).
Id.
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recognized distinction between claims based on a failure to advise and
44
claims based on misadvice is problematic.
In the space of one paragraph, the Kentucky court applied the
Fuartado rationale to foreclose Sixth Amendment claims based on
misadvice on collateral consequences. This leap in reasoning lacks a
sufficient legal explanation and is especially startling since almost all
jurisdictions that have treated this issue have determined that
misadvice may support a defendant’s claim of a Sixth Amendment
45
violation.
By almost any fair reading of the facts in Padilla and Fuartado,
Padilla’s claim of misadvice was one of first impression for the court
and the court was not bound by its holding in Fuartado. The court’s
reliance on Fuartado would have been more appropriate if Padilla’s
claim had focused solely on his counsel’s failure to advise him on the
46
possible deportation consequences of his guilty plea. Instead, Padilla
specifically inquired about the deportation consequences and his
47
counsel dispensed erroneous advice. The supreme court should have
recognized this, and realized that Fuartado’s holding did not
determine whether the Sixth Amendment set a standard for the
attorneys who choose to advise their clients on the collateral
consequences of their guilty pleas. The Supreme Court has not yet
defined the scope of the Sixth Amendment in this respect, so the Sixth
Amendment may indeed protect criminal defendants from gross
misadvice on collateral consequences even if it does not require their
defense lawyers to actively advise on collateral consequences.
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
A. Petitioner’s Argument
Padilla claimed that the Sixth Amendment does set a standard for
legal advice on collateral consequences of guilty pleas, and because

44. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. Nov. 14,
2008) (citing several state and federal court decisions that have held affirmative misadvice is a
violation of the Sixth Amendment).
45. See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 484–85 (listing cases that have concluded that gross
misadvice of a collateral consequence may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 44, at 13 (noting that all of the Federal circuits and
twenty-one states hold that giving incorrect advice on collateral consequences may qualify as
ineffective assistance of counsel).
46. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
47. Id. at 483.
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there is a standard for advice on collateral consequences, Padilla
argued that claims like his should be reviewed using the two-part
48
Strickland v. Washington test. The Sixth Amendment seeks to ensure
that criminal defendants receive legal representation that meets or
exceeds a certain standard. Permitting a limited constitutional norm
that holds that misadvice (as opposed to failure to advise) on
collateral consequences may constitute a claim under the Sixth
Amendment allows the courts to safeguard criminal defendant’s
effective representation.
Padilla contended that criminal defendants actually get
“objectively unreasonable” representation when their lawyers
49
misadvise them on collateral consequences. Gross misadvice
constitutes objectively unreasonable representation under the Sixth
Amendment, Padilla contends, because criminal defendants are
uniquely vulnerable during a criminal prosecutions and trust that
50
their attorneys will dispense informed advice. In this delicate
situation, Padilla contends that the Sixth Amendment requires
criminal defense lawyers’ advice on collateral consequences to meet a
51
standard of competence. Even if the Sixth Amendment does not
impose an affirmative obligation on criminal defense attorneys to
advise their clients on collateral consequences, this standard of
competence requires that any attorney who chooses to advise his
52
client on collateral consequences “must do so competently.”
Padilla claimed that Hill v. Lockhart shows that the Supreme
Court has been willing to consider Sixth Amendment claims based on
53
misadvice about collateral consequences. He argued that the Court,
by using the Strickland test to evaluate the claim in Hill, implicitly
rejected the notion that the Sixth Amendment did not set any
standards for advice that criminal defense attorneys choose to give on
54
collateral consequences. He contended that the Court’s reliance on
the Strickland test in Hill indicated that Sixth Amendment claims
based on misadvice about collateral consequences would be reviewed
55
for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis, not by a per se rule.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 50.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 56-57.
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Id. at 59.
Id. at 14.
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Id. at 15.
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Padilla argued that if the Court is unwilling to hold that misadvice
on collateral consequences may constitute a basis for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, it should create an exception for
misadvice on collateral immigration consequences because they are
56
so severe. Specifically, Padilla asked that deportation consequences
be analyzed under the Strickland test because deportation
consequences are uniquely harsh in their immediate effects and
because defense counsel has the ability to assist a defendant in
avoiding this consequence throughout the trial and sentencing
57
processes. For Padilla and other non-citizen defendants who are
convicted of aggravated felonies, deportation is “virtually a foregone
58
conclusion.” The automatic and direct nature of deportation is
inconsistent with the rationale behind excluding collateral
consequences from counsel’s legal obligations. As Padilla noted,
deportation is considered such a serious consequence of a guilty plea
that trial courts in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia
notify defendants of possible deportation consequences during plea
59
hearings.
B. Respondent’s Argument
Kentucky argued that the Sixth Amendment only requires a
minimum level of competency for advice on the direct consequences
of the plea, and therefore misadvice on collateral consequences
cannot be a Sixth Amendment violation. Noting that trial courts are
only required to ensure that a defendant understands the direct
60
consequences of his guilty plea, Kentucky argued that the Sixth
Amendment only sets standards for legal advice on direct
61
consequences of a plea. Kentucky contended that interpreting the
Sixth Amendment as imposing standards for advice on possible
collateral consequences “would be overly burdensome and wholly
impractical” because defense counsel would then have a duty to
ascertain and apply the vast range of collateral consequences to the
62
client.

56. Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 51.
58. Id. at 53.
59. Id. at 54.
60. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 26, at 7.
61. Id. at 9.
62. See id. at 17-18 (noting that collateral consequences can include familial consequences,
property forfeiture, and the loss of the ability to purchase alcohol).

102

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:93

Kentucky also argued that there was “no legal or rational basis”
for maintaining that the Sixth Amendment does not require advice on
collateral consequences but sets a standard for such advice when it
63
occurs. It contended that Padilla’s reliance on Hill v. Lockhart was
misplaced because that case did not explicitly hold or even address
whether misadvice on collateral consequences could be ineffective
64
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
C. Oral Arguments
At oral argument, the Court appeared sympathetic to Padilla’s
plight, yet concerned about limiting the scope of its ruling.
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor focused on deportation as
a unique consequence of a guilty plea and reflected on the difficulty
of ensuring that a defendant makes an informed, strategic choice.
Justice Ginsburg asked “why wouldn’t a lawyer whose client is an
alien have an obligation, when there is an aggravated felony as the
65
charge, to say: This will be the consequence?” Justice Sotomayor also
commented that a defendant deserves to make a strategic and well66
informed choice on whether to plead guilty or go to trial. She
hypothesized that an alien may choose to go to trial and risk serving a
longer sentence because he could serve the sentence in the United
67
States and avoid “starv[ing] to death” in his home country.
Justice Scalia doubted the Court’s ability to craft an exception
solely for deportation, commenting that one defendant might be
interested in advice on keeping custody of his children, while another
defendant may be very concerned about losing his truck, “which is his
68
main means of livelihood.” Justice Scalia questioned whether it
would be possible to follow the petitioner’s suggestion to declare
deportation a special consequence and “leave for another day” other
69
consequences. Justice Scalia’s concerns highlight the Court’s
probable unwillingness to set out special standards for advice on
collateral consequences like deportation without treating collateral
63. See id. at 10 (noting that the cases Padilla offered in Petitioner’s Brief do not contain
“any legal or rational basis” for establishing that misadvice regarding collateral consequences
may result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment).
64. Id. at 23.
65. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Padilla v. Kentucky, No. 08-651 (U.S. Oct. 13,
2009).
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id.
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consequences in general.
Although he agreed with Padilla’s counsel that deportation is a
severe consequence for someone calling the United States home,
Justice Alito asked whether courts would be faced with an
unworkable standard if the Supreme Court holds that misadvice on
collateral consequences is a Sixth Amendment violation. If a
defendant claims that defense counsel dispensed advice on collateral
consequences, but there is no documentation of this advice, how will
courts decided whether counsel actually said anything regarding
collateral consequences? In the same vein as Kentucky’s argument
that it would be impractical to require counsel to cover all possible
consequences of a guilty plea, Justice Alito also pictured a public
defender overburdened and “unable to remember what, if anything,
was said about the immigration consequences” of a past case
70
resurrected for post-conviction relief.
D. Likely Disposition
The Supreme Court will likely hold that the Sixth Amendment
does not require defense counsel to advise clients on the collateral
consequences of guilty pleas, but that it does require counsel that
chooses to advise clients on the collateral consequences of guilty pleas
71
not to provide gross misadvice. Such a holding will dispose of the
need to make a special Sixth Amendment rule for misadvice about
deportation resulting from a guilty plea. Such a special rule would be
untenable because there is no clear way to distinguish deportation
from other serious collateral consequences, such as parole eligibility
and loss of custody.
Allowing defendants to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims
for misadvice regarding collateral consequences would not result in a
new norm for competent counsel. Instead, courts, in permitting such
claims, would be able to hold lawyers accountable to preexisting
standards for the advice that they already chose to give. Nor would
such a standard lead courts to overturn many guilty pleas: even if
misadvice is a basis for a Strickland claim, defendants must still show
that the misadvice prejudiced them.
Even if the Court finds that the misadvice Padilla received could
constitute a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court might still hold

70. Id. at 10.
71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 6, at 5–7.
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that Padilla does not have an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The Court could refuse to send the case back to Kentucky for an
evidentiary hearing on the grounds that Padilla cannot show that his
attorney’s misadvice prejudiced his decision to plead guilty. Though
such an outcome is possible, it seems unlikely because it is unclear
from the record whether Padilla can show whether misadvice
prejudiced his decision to plead guilty.

